| Myanmar’s civil war began on February 1, 2021, when the Tatmadaw staged a coup against Aung San Suu Kyi’s elected government, detained the Nobel Peace Prize laureate and senior National League for Democracy officials, and triggered a resistance movement that has since killed more than 100,000 people, displaced 3.6 million, and produced Asia’s deadliest active conflict. This article covers the coup’s origins, the ethnic armed organisations and People’s Defence Force resisting junta rule, the battlefield shifts since Operation 1027, the junta’s airstrikes and mandatory conscription, the humanitarian emergency’s full scale, and why Myanmar has become the world’s most under-reported war. Universalnest.com documents this conflict in full within its War and Conflict coverage. |
How the 2021 Military Coup Ended Myanmar’s Democratic Decade and Started a Civil War
Myanmar’s military staged a coup on February 1, 2021, detaining State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint hours before a newly elected parliament was due to sit, handing power to Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and the State Administration Council he established as the governing body of military rule.
The coup’s political logic was clear even if its formal justification was not. Myanmar held a general election in November 2020, and the NLD won by a large margin. The military alleged widespread electoral fraud, a claim it did not substantiate with credible evidence. Behind the legal pretext sat a deeper concern: continued democratic consolidation threatened the military’s political influence and its control of state-owned economic conglomerates. General Min Aung Hlaing, approaching the mandatory retirement age, also faced the prospect of losing power without a transition that protected military interests.
Aung San Suu Kyi, a 1991 Nobel Peace Prize laureate, was detained on the day of the coup and later sentenced to 27 years in prison on a series of charges that her lawyers say she did not commit. Other senior NLD officials faced detention or fled into hiding.
The public response was one of the largest mass protest movements in Myanmar’s modern history. A nationwide Civil Disobedience Movement brought together doctors, civil servants, and teachers who refused to work under junta authority. Security forces responded with lethal force, killing over 600 protesters in the first weeks of resistance, according to the CFR Global Conflict Tracker. Activists who survived the initial crackdown left the cities, trained with established ethnic armed organisations in the borderlands, and formed the pro-democracy guerrilla resistance that became the People’s Defence Force.
Myanmar’s Armed Resistance: The People’s Defence Force, the Ethnic Armies, and the Spring Revolution
Myanmar’s armed resistance to the 2021 coup operates through two distinct but increasingly coordinated structures: the People’s Defence Force, established in May 2021 as the armed wing of the National Unity Government, and the ethnic armed organisations that have resisted central military rule in Myanmar’s borderlands for decades and that now control large portions of the country’s territory.
The National Unity Government (NUG) was formed by deposed NLD officials and ethnic minority representatives who refused to recognise the State Administration Council. It serves as the parallel political authority of the resistance and commands the People’s Defence Force (PDF) as its armed wing. The broader movement is referred to collectively as the Spring Revolution, a name drawn from the season in which the 2021 protests began.
Myanmar’s ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) predate the coup by decades. The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) in Kachin State and the Karen National Union (KNU) and its Karen National Liberation Army in Kayin State are among the world’s longest-running armed ethnic resistance movements. Both re-engaged in joint operations with the PDF following the coup.
The most militarily capable EAO active in the civil war is the Arakan Army (AA), operating in Rakhine State with approximately 40,000 fighters. By January 2025, the AA had taken control of 14 of Rakhine State’s 17 townships and established the Arakan People’s Revolutionary Government as a functioning parallel civil administration covering courts, taxation, and policing.
The Three Brotherhood Alliance brought together the Arakan Army, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA, also known as the Kokang army). Chinese diplomatic and logistical pressure forced the TNLA and MNDAA into ceasefires with the SAC in 2026, leaving the AA as the alliance’s most active remaining force on key fronts.
Operation 1027 and the Shifting Territorial Balance in Myanmar’s Civil War
The Myanmar civil war reached a military turning point in October 2023 when the Three Brotherhood Alliance launched Operation 1027 in northern Shan State, capturing approximately eight towns and 36 military bases in its first two months and demonstrating that the Tatmadaw could lose ground rapidly when facing coordinated multi-front pressure across different regions simultaneously.
The operation, named for its October 27 launch date, marked the largest single territorial loss for the Myanmar military in decades. Running concurrently, the Arakan Army launched its own campaign in Rakhine State. By the start of 2025, the AA held 14 of Rakhine State’s 17 townships and had established parallel government structures across its held territory under the Arakan People’s Revolutionary Government.
The junta launched counteroffensives through 2025 and into 2026, retaking Thabeikkyin in July 2025 and Singu in December 2025. On March 10, 2026, after a month-long advance supported by intensive airstrikes and artillery, SAC forces captured Tagaung, the last resistance-held town in Mandalay Region (Crisis Group, June 2026). Despite these recaptures, the military has not achieved comparable results against the Arakan Army in Rakhine or the Kachin Independence Organisation in Kachin State.
The CFR Global Conflict Tracker’s mid-2026 assessment places the territorial picture as follows: resistance forces and ethnic armed organisations hold approximately 42% of Myanmar’s territory; the junta controls approximately 21%; and the remainder is contested or frequently changing hands. The conflict has entered a stalemate phase in which neither side holds a decisive strategic advantage.
| Actor | Territory Held | Notes |
| Resistance (NUG, PDF, and EAOs) | Approximately 42% | Controls periphery: Shan, Rakhine, Kachin, Chin, Kayah regions |
| Junta (SAC and Tatmadaw) | Approximately 21% | Controls urban centres; relies heavily on airpower |
| Contested or unclear | Approximately 37% | Active fighting; territory frequently changes hands |
| Arakan Army (Rakhine) | 14 of 17 Rakhine townships (January 2025) | APRG parallel government established |
The Junta’s Methods: Airstrikes on Civilians, Mandatory Conscription, and the ICC Arrest Warrant
The State Administration Council’s military campaign relies on three documented methods: airstrikes against civilian targets including hospitals and schools, the February 2024 mandatory conscription law, and a systematic blockade of humanitarian aid to areas under resistance control. These methods prompted ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan to file an arrest warrant application for Senior General Min Aung Hlaing on November 27, 2024.
The airstrike campaign has been documented extensively by the OHCHR. In the two months following the March 28, 2025 earthquake, which killed over 5,000 people in Myanmar, the junta conducted more than 550 attacks while simultaneously blocking aid from reaching opposition-controlled areas. The OHCHR stated in March 2025 that the near-complete blockade of humanitarian aid to Rakhine State since 2023 “likely constitutes a war crime” under international humanitarian law.
Mandatory conscription was activated in February 2024, requiring all men aged 18 to 35 and women aged 18 to 27 to serve in the armed forces. The policy triggered a new wave of departures from Myanmar as young people sought to avoid being compelled to fight for the junta. Since February 2021, a total of 31,244 people have been arrested by junta forces for opposing military rule, according to AAPP data from June 2026.
ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan filed an arrest warrant application for Min Aung Hlaing on November 27, 2024, for crimes against humanity committed against the Rohingya, specifically the deportation and persecution of the Rohingya population in Myanmar and in Bangladesh between August and December 2017. Myanmar is not an ICC member state, and the junta does not recognise the court’s jurisdiction. The Pre-Trial Chamber had not yet issued a ruling on the application as of mid-2026. The ethnic persecution that forms the factual basis of the application has continued throughout the civil war.
Myanmar’s Humanitarian Emergency: 100,000 Dead, 3.6 Million Displaced, and a Population in Crisis
Myanmar’s civil war has produced Asia’s deadliest active conflict by total fatalities, with 100,114 conflict-related deaths confirmed by ACLED as of July 1, 2026, 3.6 million people internally displaced according to UNHCR data from October 2025, and 19.9 million people requiring humanitarian assistance in 2025, approximately one-third of Myanmar’s entire population.
The death toll figures require methodological context. ACLED counts all conflict-related fatalities across all parties, including combatants. The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) tracks deaths caused specifically by the junta against civilians and pro-democracy activists; its June 2026 count reached 8,122 confirmed deaths. The Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) documented 6,337 civilian deaths in just the first 20 months following the coup. All three organisations note that actual figures are higher, as access restrictions leave many killings unreported.
Internal displacement has reached a scale not seen in Myanmar’s modern history. Before the coup, approximately 300,000 people were internally displaced across the country. By October 2025, that figure had risen to 3.6 million, a 72% increase in a single year according to OHCHR. Only 15% of those displaced are in formal camps; the majority live in informal shelters, jungle locations, and active conflict zones with severe shortages of food, clean water, and medical care.
The WFP warned in late 2025 that 12 million people in Myanmar face acute hunger in 2026, with approximately 1 million expected to reach emergency levels. UNDP assessed that 2 million people in Rakhine State face starvation risk, driven by the near-complete aid blockade maintained by the junta since 2023. OCHA’s 2025 Global Humanitarian Overview identified 6.3 million children in Myanmar as requiring humanitarian assistance.
| Indicator | Figure | Source |
| Total conflict fatalities (all parties) | 100,114 | ACLED, July 1, 2026 |
| Civilians killed by junta | 8,122 | AAPP, June 25, 2026 |
| Civilian deaths in first 20 months | 6,337 | PRIO, September 2022 |
| Internally displaced persons | 3.6 million | UNHCR, October 2025 |
| IDP increase in one year | 72% | OHCHR, March 2025 |
| People requiring humanitarian aid 2025 | 19.9 million (one-third of population) | OCHA |
| People facing acute hunger 2026 | 12 million | WFP |
| Rakhine starvation risk population | 2 million | UNDP |
| People arrested by junta since February 2021 | 31,244 | AAPP, June 2026 |
Why Myanmar Is the Forgotten Crisis: ASEAN Failure, UNSC Paralysis, and Vanishing Global Attention
Myanmar’s civil war has been described by the UN’s senior official in the country as “almost invisible” to the world, a characterisation that reflects five years of ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus producing zero measurable outcomes, China and Russia blocking every binding UN Security Council resolution, and global media attention concentrated on other conflicts rather than Asia’s deadliest active war.
Gwyn Lewis, the UN’s interim Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Myanmar, used the phrase “almost invisible” during a visit to UN Headquarters in New York in December 2025. She described a situation in which humanitarian partners had been unable to deliver food to all intended recipients, with families “pushed into impossible choices,” while funding shortfalls reduced the number of people that aid organisations could target in 2026 to 4.9 million, down from 6.7 million in 2025, against a total need of 19.9 million.
ASEAN adopted the Five-Point Consensus on April 24, 2021, covering five commitments: immediate cessation of violence, constructive dialogue between parties, appointment of a mediator, humanitarian access to all affected areas, and visits by an ASEAN special envoy. As of mid-2026, none of the five points had been implemented.
At the UN Security Council, China and Russia have blocked every attempt to pass a binding Chapter VII resolution on Myanmar. A non-binding UNSC statement in February 2024 called for a cessation of hostilities but carried no enforcement mechanism. China’s position reflects both an ideological opposition to international interference in member states’ internal affairs and a material interest in protecting Belt and Road infrastructure assets in Myanmar, including pipelines and a deep-sea port in Rakhine State. By brokering ceasefires between the TNLA, MNDAA, and the SAC in 2026, China has also demonstrated its capacity to shape the conflict without aligning formally with any resolution or accountability framework.
The pattern of international silence around Myanmar, alongside the ASEAN failure and UNSC paralysis, contrasts directly with the legal and diplomatic attention given to the Iran-Israel regional confrontation and Iran’s proxy network, which has been the subject of continuous UNSC debate.
Myanmar Civil War 2021 to 2026: Coup, Resistance, Forgotten Emergency, and No End in Sight
Myanmar’s civil war, now in its sixth year, has killed more than 100,000 people, displaced 3.6 million, forced a mandatory conscription law onto a traumatised population, and produced a humanitarian emergency that the United Nations itself describes as invisible to the world. The Tatmadaw controls only 21% of the country it claims to govern. Ethnic armed organisations and the People’s Defence Force hold 42%. Between them lies a population enduring airstrikes, aid blockades, and famine conditions with no international enforcement mechanism in place and no ASEAN or UNSC resolution producing measurable change. The War and Conflict coverage on Universalnest.com documents Myanmar alongside the broader pattern of global conflicts shaping current affairs in 2025 and 2026.
Frequently Asked Questions
When did Myanmar’s civil war begin and what triggered it?
Myanmar’s civil war began on February 1, 2021, when the Tatmadaw staged a coup against Aung San Suu Kyi’s elected government, alleging fraud in the November 2020 election. Armed resistance emerged after security forces killed hundreds of protesters, and the National Unity Government established the People’s Defence Force in May 2021.
What is the National Unity Government and does it control any territory?
The National Unity Government is the opposition political authority formed by deposed NLD officials and ethnic minority representatives. It commands the People’s Defence Force and is allied with ethnic armed organisations that collectively hold approximately 42% of Myanmar’s territory, according to CFR’s mid-2026 assessment.
What is the Arakan Army and why is it considered the strongest resistance force?
The Arakan Army is a Rakhine ethnic armed organisation with approximately 40,000 fighters that controlled 14 of Rakhine State’s 17 townships by January 2025. It established the Arakan People’s Revolutionary Government as a parallel civil administration governing courts, taxation, and policing across its held territory.
What was Operation 1027 and what did it achieve?
Operation 1027 was a Three Brotherhood Alliance offensive launched on October 27, 2023, in northern Shan State. In its first two months, the junta lost roughly eight towns and 36 military bases, marking the largest single territorial loss for Myanmar’s military since the civil war began.
Has the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Min Aung Hlaing?
The ICC has not yet issued a warrant for Min Aung Hlaing. Prosecutor Karim Khan filed an application on November 27, 2024, for crimes against humanity against the Rohingya in 2017. The Pre-Trial Chamber had not yet ruled on the application as of mid-2026.
Why is Myanmar called a forgotten conflict?
UN Humanitarian Coordinator Gwyn Lewis described Myanmar in December 2025 as “almost invisible” to the international community. Global media attention has concentrated on Ukraine and Gaza, while UNSC binding action has been blocked by China and Russia, leaving 19.9 million people requiring aid with no international enforcement mechanism.
What happened to Myanmar’s Rohingya population?
In August 2017, the Myanmar military drove over 700,000 Rohingya to Bangladesh, where more than 1.1 million now live in refugee camps. The International Court of Justice has ongoing genocide proceedings against Myanmar, and the ICC filed an arrest warrant application for Min Aung Hlaing for Rohingya-related crimes against humanity in November 2024.
What is China’s role in Myanmar’s civil war?
China supports the Myanmar junta economically and diplomatically while blocking binding UNSC resolutions. Simultaneously, China has brokered ceasefires between the Arakan Army, TNLA, MNDAA, and the SAC to protect its Belt and Road infrastructure investments, including pipelines and a deep-sea port in Rakhine State.
